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“GUNBA CONTROL” THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEMIAUTONOMOUS ROBOTIC WEAPONS
Major Steven P. Szymanski

A Guiding Hypothetical
Marion, a 76-year-old man, lives alone in his home. One night, an armed
intruder breaks into his house. Marion is startled by the commotion, locks the
door to his bedroom, and calls the police. Unfortunately, he knows that help
will not arrive for at least eight minutes. Luckily, Marion owns a new remotely
controlled armed robot that resembles a contemporary robotic vacuum. As
Marion locks himself in his bedroom, the “Gunba” moves into position to view
the intruder. It sends a high-definition live feed image of the trespasser to
Marion’s cell phone. Marion does not recognize the intruder and sees that he is
carrying a knife. Fearing for his life, Marion presses a button on his phone that
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commands the robot to fire a well-aimed 9mm round into the intruder, killing
him. The police arrive soon thereafter to process the scene. Marion shows the
officers the recorded footage saved on his phone. A responding officer remarks,
“Thank goodness for those Gunbas, another life saved.”
Commercial robots and drones are becoming increasingly common in modern
society. From household chores to healthcare, automated robots are
revolutionizing society by competently performing functions previously
relegated to humans.1 Flying drone delivery systems may soon fill the skies to
offer same-day delivery.2 Indeed, the world is entering a new era of
extraordinary innovation that promises to substantially improve the human
condition.
As with any new technology however, the prospect exists that it will be
misused for harmful purposes. Increasingly, commercial drones have been
utilized as tools for privacy invasion.3 “Peeping Toms” need not climb a tree to
get a prurient peek into a second-floor window.4 Intrusive paparazzi have
employed so-called “dronerazzi” to snatch photos and footage of celebrities to
meet the public demand for gossip and intrigue.5 More troubling is the potential
risk that these robots could be weaponized: unlawfully used by criminals or
terrorists to fire small arms or drop explosives onto civilian targets.
The proof of concept has been demonstrated on overseas battlefields.6
Terrorist groups have employed inexpensive commercial drone technology to

1
Natalia Galvis, 4 Industries that Robots Are Revolutionizing, ROBOTLAB (June 4,
2021) (explaining that certain surgical robots are considered the “standard of care” for
minimally invasive prostatectomies. Robots also assist in hysterectomies, lung surgeries,
and other types of procedures).
2
Annie Palmer, Amazon Wins FAA Approval for Prime Air Drone Delivery Fleet,
CNBC (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/31/amazon-prime-now-dronedelivery-fleet-gets-faa-approval.html.
3
Patti Dozier, Drone Peering into Windows under Investigation, THOMASVILLE TIMESENTERPRISE (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.timesenterprise.com/news/local_news/dronepeering-into-windows-under-investigation/article_12750873-b36a-50e3-bb62ad7184c891d7.html. See also Peeping Tom Uses Drone to Look into Woodbridge Woman’s
Bedroom Window, INSIDE NOVA (Mar. 18, 2021),
https://www.insidenova.com/headlines/peeping-tom-uses-drone-to-look-in-woodbridgewomans-bedroom-window/article_2ca064b4-8813-11eb-980d-5b0cf04f6b37.html
[hereinafter INSIDE NOVA].
4
INSIDE NOVA, supra note 3.
5
Jon Pfeiffer, Paparazzi by Drone: Is this Legal?, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://abovethelaw.com/2016/04/paparazzi-by-drone-is-this-legal/.
6
Joby Warrick, Use of Weaponized Drones by ISIS Spurs Terrorism Fears, WASH.
POST (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/use-ofweaponized-drones-by-isis-spurs-terrorism-fears/2017/02/21/9d83d51e-f382-11e6-8d72263470bf0401_story.html.

2021]

The Constitutionality of Semi-Autonomous Robotic Weapons

101

drop explosives on service members, allies, and civilian targets. 7 Unfortunately,
it may only be a matter of time before a nefarious actor attempts such an attack
in the homeland. Moreover, it is not difficult to envision an assassin attempting
an attack on a prominent political figure via a remote-controlled drone.
Predictably, both Congress and the state legislatures have enacted laws
regulating the various uses for commercial flying drones.8 In 2018, Congress
passed the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act, proscribing the unauthorized
operation of “an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system that is equipped
or armed with a dangerous weapon.”9 An offender may receive a civil fine up
to $25,000 per infraction.10 However, no such comparable legislation yet exists
for terrestrial drones or remote-controlled robots designed for home defense.
This article addresses the question of whether certain remotely operated
robotic weapons would be protected under the Second Amendment.11 Part I will
analyze the landmark Supreme Court decision, District of Columbia v. Heller,
and its progeny.12 Specifically, it will highlight Heller’s framework for
determining the constitutionality of gun control legislation and the derivative
tests that have been adopted by the majority of federal and state jurisdictions. 13
Part II will outline the general legal and policy arguments for and against the use
of remotely controlled weapons. Finally, Part III will apply the majority judicial
test to three foreseeable remote-controlled weapons systems to forecast whether
the Second Amendment would protect those systems from legislative bans.
First, it will analyze an armed flying drone designed to patrol the outdoor
perimeter of one’s property from the sky. Second, it will consider an armed
version of the “Digidog,” a controversial robot that had been recently employed
for reconnaissance purposes by the New York City Police Department.14 The
7
Id.; see also David Verdun, DOD Developing Small, Unmanned Aerial Systems for
Warfighters, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2318919/dod-developing-smallunmanned-aerial-system-for-warfighters/ (detailing DOD’s developmental small, unmanned
aerial system/drone program).
8
See generally Drone Laws in the United States of America, UAV COACH,
https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-in-united-states-of-america/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2021)
(providing summaries and links to laws and regulations for each state. Common
requirements include restrictions on where they can be flown and different licensure
requirements for hobbyist and commercial users).
9
FAA Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 363, 132 Stat. 3308 (2018)
(codified as 49 U.S.C. § 44802 note (2018)).
10 Id.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.”).
12 See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
13 See generally id. (discussing the important limitations on gun ownership adopted by
courts and legislatures).
14 Emma Bowman, ‘Creepy’ Robot Dog Loses Job with New York Police Department,
NPR (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/30/992551579/creepy-robot-dog-loses-
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specific question is: could an armed Digidog, equipped with significant safety
features and designed to act as a bodyguard or sentry outside of the home,
receive Second Amendment protection?15 Finally, it will examine the
hypothetical “Gunba.” As depicted in the guiding hypothetical, the Gunba is
designed to work exclusively inside of one’s home and includes a myriad of
safety features to ensure that it will not operate outside of in-home defense. This
work concludes that the armed flying drone and Digidog would most likely not
be protected by the Second Amendment. However, an armed remotely
controlled robot like the Gunba, specifically designed for in-home self-defense,
would be safeguarded.
I. SELF DEFENSE AND SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Prior to analyzing specific remotely controlled weapons, this section reviews
the legal parameters for the lawful use of deadly force in self-defense and the
legal test(s) that courts use when determining whether legislative weapon bans
violate the Second Amendment.16 Together, this analysis provides the
foundation used to determine whether: (1) certain remotely controlled weapons
would be shielded by the Second Amendment; and (2) the lawful parameters of
their use.
A. The Inherent Right of Self-Defense
The inherent right of self-defense has been a touchstone of U.S. law since its
founding.17 Historian Joyce Lee Malcom writes, “[t]he Second Amendment was
meant to accomplish two distinct goals, each perceived as crucial to the
maintenance of liberty. First it was meant to guarantee the individual’s right to
have arms for self-defense and self-preservation. . . . The second and related
objective concerned the militia,” as the clause concerning the militia was not
intended to limit ownership of arms to militia members.18
In keeping with this principle, courts have historically respected the right of
job-with-new-york-police-department.
15 This work will purposefully scope the subject to remote-controlled weapons, not fully
autonomous weapons. I assess the legality of remote-controlled weapons will be the first to
be encountered and the analysis will provide a baseline for future analysis into how the
Second Amendment would treat autonomous weapons legislation. Id.
16 See U.S. CONST. amend II.
17 See id.; see also Ronald S. Resnick, Private Arms as the Palladium of Liberty: The
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 14 n.27 (1999) (citing
several Founding Fathers views that the Second Amendment is premised on self-defense).
18 JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLOAMERICAN RIGHT 162–63 (1994).
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individuals to defend themselves with deadly force if they are confronted with
the threat of lethal force.19 Further, the common law did not limit the right or
impose an obligation to flee rather than exercise self-defense.20 In the 1896 case
of Beard v. United States, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f the accused . . . had at the time reasonable grounds to believe,
and in good faith believed, that the deceased intended to take his life,
or do him great bodily harm, he was not obliged to retreat, nor
consider whether he could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his
ground, and meet any attack made upon him with a deadly weapon,
in such a way and with such force as, under all the circumstances, he,
at the moment, honestly believed, and had reasonable grounds to
believe, were necessary to save his own life, or to protect himself
from great bodily injury.21
While courts have consistently held that the use of deadly force in self-defense
is justified when a reasonable belief of great bodily injury exists, the right to use
such force significantly diminishes when mere property interests are at stake.
B. The Spring Gun Case
Upon reading the guiding hypothetical, law students and attorneys may
immediately recall their Torts class during their first year of law school. Katko
v. Briney, also known as “the spring gun case,” remains one of the most
fascinating and memorable reads in legal education.22 Germane to this work,
the case also informs the rules and parameters of civil liability when defending
one’s property with deadly force.23 In that regard, it is worth revisiting.
In Katko, one of the defendants inherited an unoccupied farmhouse.24 For ten
19 See State v. Misch, No. 19-266, 2021 WL 650366, at *3 (Vt. Feb. 19, 2021)
(generally discussing and rejecting the argument that the Second Amendment does not
contain an individual right of self-defense). But see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 646–47 (2008), (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the origin of the term “bear arms”
in the Second Amendment most likely was in relation to the military defense of the
collective).
20 Heller, 554 U.S. at 632–35.
21 Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 551–52, 564 (1895) (noting that Mr. Beard’s
land was trespassed by three armed men who sought to steal a cow and take his life. To
protect himself, Beard struck one man in the head with a rifle, causing death); see also
Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (affirming the common law recognition
of the inherent right of self-defense when reasonably necessary to protect one’s life); United
States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding that there is no duty to
retreat from an assault producing imminent danger); Silas v. Bowen, 277 F. Supp. 314, 318
(D.S.C. 1967) (stating that the use of a deadly weapon in self-defense is justified if a
reasonable person would anticipate serious bodily harm).
22 See generally Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
23 Id. at 659–61.
24 Id. at 658.
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years, trespassers periodically accessed the building.25 Although the Brineys
boarded up the windows and posted no trespassing signs, the trespassers
persisted.26 Eventually, the defendants set a spring gun: a 20-gauge shotgun
rigged with a wire from the doorknob in one of the rooms to the gun’s trigger.27
No signs or other warnings about the gun were posted.28
The plaintiff, a scavenger looking for old bottles and jars, had previously
trespassed into the farmhouse prior to the spring gun’s installation.29 When the
plaintiff opened the door in this instance, the shotgun was triggered and severely
injured his leg.30 To add insult to injury, the plaintiff was also criminally
punished by a fine of $50 and a 60-day jail sentence for the underlying trespass.31
However, despite the fact that the plaintiff entered the premises with a criminal
purpose, he prevailed in his civil action against Briney.32
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the defense that spring guns were
permissible means of defending property on the grounds that human life and
limb supersede property interests.33 The court explained: “[T]he law has always
placed a higher value upon human safety than upon mere rights in property, it is
the accepted rule that there is no privilege to use any force calculated to cause
death or serious bodily injury to repel the threat to land or chattels, unless there
is also such a threat to the defendant’s personal safety as to justify selfdefense.”34 In so finding, the Court also affirmed rationale offered in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 85, “Use of Mechanical Device Threatening
Death or Serious Bodily Injury.”35
The Katko decision supports the notion that people are privileged to use
deadly traps (i.e. “mechanical devices”) to protect themselves and others against

Id.
Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 659.
32 Id. at 658.
33 Id. at 667.
34 Id. at 660 (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 116–18 (3d ed. 1964)); see
also Randy Maniloff, Meet the Lawyer, 93, Who Tried the Torts Spring-Gun Case,
LAW.COM (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/01/30/meet-the-lawyer93-who-tried-the-torts-spring-gun-case/.
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 85 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“The actor is so far
privileged to use a device intended or likely to cause serious bodily harm or death for the
purpose of protecting his land or chattels from intrusion that he is not liable for the serious
bodily harm or death thereby caused to an intruder whose intrusion is, in fact, such that the
actor, were he present, would be privileged to prevent or terminate it by the intentional
infliction of such harm.”).
25
26
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deadly force if their use is otherwise reasonable under the rules for selfdefense.36 If the deadly force is used to protect against “mere trespass,” the
proponent of that force will most likely be held liable for damages.37 Thus, if
the facts of Katko were slightly modified, and the Brineys were present in the
barn at time Mr. Katko trespassed, the court may have found that the use of the
spring gun was lawful if the Brineys could demonstrate that they possessed a
reasonable belief that Mr. Katko would pose an imminent risk of great bodily
injury.
Clearly, target identification is a major distinction between foreseeable
modern remote-controlled weapons and the spring gun employed in Katko. The
capacity of live feed cameras to project images and video to a user’s phone
permits a more informed decision about whether the person is a “mere
trespasser” or someone that poses a threat to the extent that lethal force may be
used in self-defense. However, the Katko scenario does raise an inference of
liability if a mechanical weapon system were to be employed merely to protect
property, and not injury to life or limb.
Now that the general self-defense parameters for use of deadly force have
been reviewed, we next shift to how Courts analyze the constitutionality of gun
control legislation.
C. The Heller Framework
In 2008, Justice Antonin Scalia authored the 5-4 majority opinion in the
landmark case District of Columbia v. Heller.38 The consummate originalist
highlighted that the case provided an opportunity to conduct an “in-depth
examination of the Second Amendment.”39 The opinion sought to answer two
crucial questions. First, does the Second Amendment recognize an individual
right or one that is tied to militias for collective protection? Second, how should
courts analyze gun control legislation?
In Heller, the Supreme Court considered a D.C. law that categorically banned
possession of handguns in the home and required that all other firearms in homes
(e.g., registered long guns) be disassembled and unloaded or bound by a trigger
lock.40 A suit was filed after a District of Columbia police officer was denied a

DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 87 (2d ed. 2021).
Id.; Katko, 183 N.W.2d at 662.
38 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 572, 636 (2008).
39 Id. at 635. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) (“In interpreting
this text, we are guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning.”).
40 Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75.
36
37
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permit to possess a semiautomatic handgun in his home.41 As Scalia notes, the
litigants presented starkly different interpretations of the Second Amendment. 42
The District of Columbia and Justice Stevens argued that the Second
Amendment “protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection
with militia service.”43 In contrast, Mr. Heller argued that the Second
Amendment “protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with
service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as
self-defense within the home.”44 After conducting a thorough review of the
Second Amendment’s plain meaning at the time its drafting, Justice Scalia and
the majority rejected Justice Stevens’ position and found that Second
Amendment bestows an individual right to keep and bear arms.45 Recognizing
that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,” Scalia
emphasized that “the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”46
Upon finding an individual right to bear arms, the Court struck down the D.C.
statute, reasoning that the handgun ban “amounts to a prohibition of an entire
class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for selfdefense, and that the requirement that firearms be kept inoperable in the home
made it “impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of selfdefense.”47 While acknowledging that the Second Amendment can certainly be
regulated, the Court declined to specify the standard that applied to Second
Amendment protections.48 Instead, the Court stated that “[u]nder any of the
[heightened] standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred [commonly
used] firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of one’s home and
family,’ would fail constitutional muster.”49
In the conclusion, Scalia acknowledged the country’s gun violence problem
and offered that the Constitution leaves the District of Columbia with many tools
and regulations by which to address the problem.50 However, “the enshrinement
of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.” 51
Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 577.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 578–95 (reviewing different interpretations of the Second Amendment).
46 Id. at 626.
47 Id. at 628–30.
48 Id. at 626–27.
49 Id. at 628–29 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir.
2007)).
50 Id. at 636.
51 Id.
41
42
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Though the Heller decision left room for legislative and judicial interpretation
on specific standards to apply to gun control legislation, the Court established
two guiding principles for analysis. These rules will also serve useful when
considering remotely controlled weapons.
Rule 1. Like other constitutional rights, the Second Amendment “is not
unlimited.”52 It protects arms “in common use” —those that are typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, like self-defense.53
Conversely, the Second Amendment does not protect arms which are
“dangerous and unusual,” like certain military service weapons. 54 Additionally,
certain longstanding gun control measures such as registration requirements,
restrictions on the mentally ill or felons from owning firearms, are
“presumptively lawful.”55
Rule 2. The “core” Second Amendment right concerns the ability to exercise
self-defense in one’s home.56 The majority observed that “whatever else [the
Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in
defense of hearth and home.”57 Thus, gun control legislation that infringes upon
a citizen’s ability to use a common-use weapon for self-defense in the home will
likely face maximum scrutiny.58
D. The Federal and State Tests for Gun Control Legislation
1. The Federal Approach and Application:
Following Heller, federal and state jurisdictions have adopted differing
approaches to gun control legislation.59 Federal courts have largely embraced a
two-pronged analysis, referred to as the “Marzzarella two-step” analysis, named
after a Third Circuit case decided two years after Heller.60 The Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have adopted

Id. at 626.
Id. at 625 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
54 Id. at 627.
55 Id. at 627 n.26.
56 Id. at 630.
57 Id. at 635.
58 See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 767–68, 791 (2010) (invalidating a
similar ban on handguns in the home and reiterating the Heller principles and holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms for
the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states).
59 See id. at 752–53, 791; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 87, 89 (3d Cir.
2010).
60 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
52
53
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this standard.61
The Marzzarella two-step first asks whether the statute/activity at issue
burdens a Second Amendment right.62 If the court determines that a burden
exists, it moves to the second prong and applies “heightened scrutiny” to the law
that varies in intensity based on the severity of the burden.63 It is not universally
understood whether the “heightened scrutiny” is akin to intermediate or strict
scrutiny used in other constitutional contexts.64 For instance, the Seventh Circuit
has avoided the traditional standard of review monikers, and instead requires
that the government establish a “strong public interest justification” for the law
to be upheld.65
The 2015 case of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association. v. Cuomo
provides a useful illustration of the test’s application.66 In that case, the Second
Circuit considered whether New York and Connecticut’s ban on so-called
“assault rifles” and “high-capacity” magazines were lawful. 67 In determining
whether the statutes placed a burden upon the Second Amendment, the court
first asked if the items were (1) in “common use” and (2) “typically possessed
by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”68
To answer the “in common use” question, both parties offered statistics to
make their respective claims. The plaintiffs offered evidence that millions of
“assault rifles” and “large-capacity magazines” have been sold in the United
61 See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 788 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th
Cir. 2015); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); NRA v. Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir.
2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of
Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d
684, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir.
2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010).
62 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d
242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that if the statute does not burden the Second
Amendment, the analysis ends, and the legislation stands).
63 Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 257, 258–59.
64 See generally, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (detailing intermediate scrutiny
standards for sex-based classification statutes); Brown v. Bd. of Ed. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(detailing strict scrutiny standards for race-based classifications statutes).
65 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708.
66 See generally Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 254 (demonstrating the application of the public
interest test).
67 Id. at 252. The New York legislation, known as the Secure Ammunition and Firearms
Enforcement (SAFE) Act, defined a semiautomatic firearm as a prohibited “assault weapon”
if it contains any one of an enumerated list of military-style features, including a telescoping
stock, a conspicuously protruding pistol grip, a thumbhole stock, a bayonet mount, a flash
suppressor, a barrel shroud, and a grenade launcher. “High-capacity” magazines were
defined as magazines that can hold more than ten rounds of ammunition. S. Assemb. 2388,
236th Leg., Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
68 Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 254–55.
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States since 1986.69 Further, they produced evidence that most of the weapons
and magazines were purchased by civilians as opposed to law enforcement
personnel.70 The defendants countered with statistics showing that assault
weapons constitute a small percentage of overall guns in circulation in the U.S.71
However, the court found that the items were in “common use.”72
The court then considered whether the weapons were “typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” 73 Again, the plaintiffs offered
statistical evidence demonstrating that the vast percentage of gun-related crimes
do not involve an assault rifle.74 The defendants countered with evidence that
most mass shootings in the United States were perpetrated using assault
weapons.75 The court opined that looking at crime statistics alone was
insufficient, and it must also consider whether the weapons and magazines were
“dangerous and unusual” in the hands of ordinary citizens.76 Ultimately, the
court concluded that it could not clearly answer whether the items were typically
used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.77 Consequently, it proceeded
to the balancing test prong of the analysis based on the assumption that the law
burdened a Second Amendment right.78
In determining the level of scrutiny to apply to the laws, the court considered
two factors: (1) “how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment
right” and (2) “the severity of the law’s burden on the right.” 79 It reasoned that
laws that neither implicate the core protections of the Second Amendment, nor
significantly burden their exercise will receive heightened scrutiny.80 However,
the court determined that the ban on assault rifles and high- capacity magazines
would extend into the home, “where the need for defense of self, family and
property, is most acute.”81 Yet, the court determined that assault rifles were not
nearly as commonly used or popular for in-home self-defense as the handguns
at issue in Heller.82
The court further distinguished the assault rifle and magazine proscription
from Heller by noting that the law was not as sweeping as Heller’s ban on an

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 255, 260.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008)).
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 257; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 258.
Id.
Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
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“entire class” of semiautomatic handguns.83 Rather, the New York law related
more to style or features of a certain subset of semiautomatic firearms.84 Thus,
residents had viable alternatives to retain their ability to protect themselves in
their homes with other semiautomatic weapons or with magazines with a
capacity of ten rounds or less.85 As a result, the court concluded that the burden
placed on the Second Amendment was not sufficiently severe to warrant strict
scrutiny, and thus applied intermediate scrutiny.86
The final step in the court’s process was to apply intermediate scrutiny to the
legislation. The District Court determined the statutes were “substantially
related to the achievement of an important governmental interest.” 87 The court
noted that, unlike strict scrutiny, statutes can survive intermediate scrutiny even
if they are not narrowly tailored or crafted using the “least restrictive means.”88
All that is necessary is that the statutes be substantially related to the important
governmental interest. Consequently, the court found that the government’s
interest in preventing mass casualty events like the Sandy Hook Elementary
School shooting and the protection of law enforcement officers were sufficient
to overcome intermediate scrutiny.89
2. The State Approach
In contrast to the two-pronged analysis used by the Federal Circuits, most
state courts apply a much less stringent “reasonable regulation” test, which
offers greater deference to legislatures and state police powers.90 Over half of
the forty-three states with “right-to-bear-arms” provisions protecting an
individual’s right have explicitly adopted a reasonable regulation test, with
several others implicitly adopting such a standard.91 Under the reasonable
regulation test, courts “analyze[ ] whether the statute at issue is a ‘reasonable’
limitation upon the right to bear arms.”92 In application, if the government can
demonstrate that a weapon poses a risk to law enforcement or the public, and

Id. at 260 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
Id. at 260.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 260–61.
87 Id. at 261.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 263.
90 Id. at 261–62.
91 Bruce D. Black & Kara L. Kapp, State Constitutional Law as a Basis for Federal
Constitutional Interpretation: The Lessons of the Second Amendment, 46 N.M. L. REV. 240,
250–52, n.57–58 (2016) (explaining each state’s regulations).
92 Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t, 927 A.2d 1216, 1223 (N.H. 2007).
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that its actions are reasonable, the state legislation will most likely be upheld. 93
E. The Kavanaugh Dissent in Heller II.
Before returning to the discussion of remote controlled weapons, it is
important to note Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent in Heller II.94 Similar to the
Second Circuit’s approach to the New York assault rifle ban analyzed above, the
D.C. Circuit majority used the same two-step analysis to uphold a similar
“assault rifle” ban.95 In his dissent, Judge Kavanaugh argued that the two-step
balancing test, as employed in Marzzarella, is based on a compete misreading
of Heller, which he contends plainly prohibited the use of balancing tests when
the core right of self-defense in one’s home was burdened. 96 Rather than a
balancing test weighing the government’s interest in such scenarios, Judge
Kavanaugh argued that Heller’s “common use” test permitted legislative bans
only on classes of weapons, “that have been banned in our ‘historical
tradition’— namely guns that are ‘dangerous and unusual’ and thus are not ‘the
sorts of lawful weapons that’ citizens typically possess at home.”97
With regard to emerging technology, Judge Kavanaugh conceded that
applying a historical tradition approach may be difficult, since the new weapons
will not be of “common use.”98 He also acknowledged the inherent circularity
within the approach; that is, if the government swiftly outlaws emerging
weapons technology, the citizenry will be robbed of the opportunity to develop
“common usage.”99 However, he reasoned that the challenge in analyzing
modern technological advances “is hardly unique to the Second Amendment . .
. [and] an essential component to rigorous judicial decision-making [sic] . . . .”100
Since Kavanaugh’s dissent in Heller II, the “historical tradition” approach has
garnered judicial support in at least one instance. In Gowder v. City of Chicago,
the Northern District of Illinois considered a law prohibiting certain convicted
misdemeanants from possessing firearms.101 Rather than employing the
Marzzarella two-step balancing test, the judge looked to the historical record
93 Id.; see also State v. Misch, 256 A.3d 519, 546 (Vt. 2021) (applying the reasonable
regulation standard to a Vermont law banning “high capacity” magazines).
94 See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1269–96 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 1252.
96 Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
97 Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008)).
98 Id. at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Gowder v. City of Chi., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
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and found that while felons were traditionally disqualified from gun ownership,
misdemeanants were not.102 Thus, he found that the law was unconstitutional.103
While the Marzzarella two-step remains the predominant judicial test for
federal courts to analyze gun control legislation, Justice Kavanaugh’s elevation
to the Supreme Court since his dissent in Heller II may be intriguing if/when the
High Court hears its next Second Amendment case, especially if that case
concerns legislation that directly burdens the core right of self-defense in one’s
home.
II. THE CASE FOR & AGAINST REMOTELY CONTROLLED WEAPONS
FOR SELF-DEFENSE
A. Arguments in Favor of Remotely Controlled Weapons
Though the idea of armed robots ubiquitously rolling, walking, or flying
around may conjure images of dystopian 1980s movies, there are valid reasons
why the technology should not be reflexively dismissed. This section highlights
the benefits of legalizing remotely controlled weapons.
In 2013, Dan Terzian published an article entitled, The Right to Bear
(Robotic) Arms.104 His work primarily centered on the question of whether the
Second Amendment’s use of the word “bear” imposed a requirement for arms
to be “wearable.”105 If there were such a requirement, robotic or remotecontrolled weapons would likely be categorically eliminated from the Second
Amendment’s protection.106 Terzian contends that imposing such a “wearable”
requirement is not only unsupported by history and contrary to the core of the
Heller decision (self-defense), but is also imprudent.107
The article suggests that technological advances will soon make weaponized
robots safer than the traditional use of arms.108 He cites declining numbers of
gun owners and a diminishing societal value placed on proper weapons
training.109 According to a study conducted between 1973 and 2018, the

Id. at 1122; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
Gowder, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
104 See generally Dan Terzian, The Right to Bear (Robotic) Arms, 117 PENN ST. L. REV.
755 (2013).
105 Id. at 757.
106 Id. Interestingly, Terzian highlights that Justice Scalia remarked on a television
interview that arms needed to be wearable by implication of the term “bear.” However, he
admitted that the sole basis for his opinion was a Black’s Law Dictionary definition. Id.
107 Id. at 758.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 781–82.
102
103
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percentage of American households that reported having any guns in the home
dropped by 32%.110 In the 1970s the number of households that reported owning
a firearm was between 46% and 50%.111 Meanwhile, in 2018, that percentage
dropped to the low 30s.112
Terzian posits that the declining numbers of weapons is indicative of a society
that does not value the utility or recreational value of firearms as it once did for
hunting and sport shooting.113 Accompanying the decline in firearm ownership
has been a reduced societal emphasis on proper training and safety.114 In other
words, when firearm ownership was more common, there was a greater societal
emphasis on safety and proper training. Paradoxically, personal arms reduction
has led to an increased safety risk.
Building on Terzian’s points, armed robots may provide a viable self-defense
option to those who are unfamiliar with firearms or even fearful of them. 115
Referencing the guiding hypothetical at the beginning of this piece, Marion may
be unfamiliar with weapon safety or may have physical limitations, like arthritis,
that prevents him from handling a firearm in a proficient or safe manner.
Remotely controlled weapons could provide a life-saving option for people who
are uncomfortable or untrained in handling weapons, but who otherwise want to
protect themselves and their families.116
Further, even if Marion were in his early thirties and an expert in firearms, he
still risks grave personal harm or injury by confronting the armed intruder. A
2019 study of the Dallas Police Department revealed that in more than 130 police
shootings, the officers hit their intended target only 35% of the time.117 Other
110 The Long-Term Decline in Gun Ownership in America: 1973 to 2018, VIOLENCE
POL’Y CTR. (2020), https://www.vpc.org/studies/ownership.pdf [hereinafter VIOLENCE
POL’Y CTR.].
111 Id. Terzian also explores the concept of Second Amendment “auxiliary rights.” He
argues that the Second Amendment protects more than just arms, but also elements
necessary to ensure that the core right (self-defense) is protected and practicable. Thus,
legislation banning bullets, or gun ranges would presumably be barred by the Second
Amendment. Similarly, he proposes that right to own an armed robot is analogous to the
presumably protected auxiliary right to hire an armed bodyguard from protection. Terzian,
supra note 104, at 790.
112 VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., supra note 110.
113 Terzian, supra note 104, at 782.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 781. See Bruce N. Eimar & Alan Korwin, Is Hoplophobia Real?
GUNLAWS.COM (2013), https://www.gunlaws.com/Hoplophobia-GunFear.htm (describing
hoplophobia, a morbid fear of firearms).
116 Terzian, supra note 104, at 789.
117 Scottie Andrew, Why Police Shoot So Many Times to Bring Down a Suspect, CNN
(Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/26/us/why-police-shoot-so-many-roundstrnd/index.html; see Christopher M. Donner & Nicole Popovich, Hitting (or Missing) the
Mark: An Examination of Police Shooting Accuracy in Officer-Involved Shooting Incidents,
42 POLICING: AN INT’L J, No. 3, 474–89.
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studies have shown various department “miss rates” to be even lower. 118 If
trained police officers miss at such an alarming frequency, one can only presume
what the accuracy rates of people not trained in firearm use may be.
The factors contributing to the inaccuracy of trained police officers pertain to
physiological effects that come from being involved in life-or-death scenario.119
As a result of involuntary physiological responses, people often experience a
loss of fine motor skills, auditory exclusion, time-space distortion, loss of
peripheral vision, memory gaps, and intrusive thoughts.120 Accordingly, a loss
of fine motor skills degrades one’s ability to draw, reload, and manipulate a
weapon.121 These effects are magnified in poorly-trained firearm handlers.122
Simply put, even when homeowners are trained and relatively comfortable with
their weapons, they incur significant risk when confronting an armed intruder.
The prospect of mitigating that risk using technologically advanced robots is
tremendous.
B. Arguments Against Robotic Arms and Responses
As with any weapon, remotely controlled arms could be used for criminal
purposes. While such weapons could provide homeowners the ability to defend
themselves without being forced to confront an intruder, the same weapons
could also be used against police officers executing lawful warrants or innocent
members of the population. When ruling on the legality of weapon bans, courts
have considered the enhanced risk that specific types of firearms pose to the
public and law enforcement officers.123 Thus, the legality of remotely controlled
weapons may depend on the installation of design features that ensure robotic
weapons are only used for lawful purposes.
The initial legal hurdle for remotely controlled weapons lies with the common
use test.124 As noted in Heller and Cuomo, courts consider statistics to ascertain
the volume of sales and whether they were sold to civilian or law enforcement
entities to determine if the subject weapon is in “common use” for lawful
purposes.125 If legislatures were to preemptively ban the manufacture and
Andrew, supra note 117. See Donner & Popovich, supra note 117, at 474–89.
DAVID G. BOLGIANO, COMBAT SELF-DEFENSE: SAVING AMERICA’S WARRIORS FROM
RISK-AVERSE COMMANDERS AND THEIR LAWYERS 75 (Little White Books 2007).
120 Id. at 75–76.
121 Id. at 75.
122 Id.
123 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 623 (2008); N.Y. State Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 262 (2d Cir. 2015).
124 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
125 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1258–59, 1287 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 255.
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proliferation of remotely controlled weapons before they become commercially
available, an appellate court may be compelled to uphold such a ban based on
the weapon’s failure to obtain common usage.
However, the common use test could be overcome if manufacturers
exclusively installed firearms that have already been deemed to be in common
usage and comport with all available legal and regulatory requirements (e.g., the
semiautomatic handguns at issue in Heller.).126 If remotely controlled robots
simply contained an internal semiautomatic handgun that fired the same
ammunition as conventional handguns, courts may find that the specific
remotely controlled weapon is “in common use at the time,” notwithstanding the
uncommon robotic delivery platform. 127
If the common use test were to be satisfied, opponents would then argue that
robotic weapons are “dangerous or unusual.”128 Challengers would contend that
they are uniquely dangerous because they are designed to operate without the
owner asserting physical control. This feature makes it easier for bad actors to
use remote-controlled weapons to commit crimes without being co-located with
the weapon. This issue could inhibit law enforcement efforts to find and arrest
violent criminals. Moreover, the physical separation between the owner and
weapon may make remotely operated weapons susceptible to theft or tampering
by nefarious actors or curious children.
Opponents may also modify this work’s guiding hypothetical scenario to
portray a tragic outcome. For instance, imagine if Marion, via confusion or
discomfort with operating the remote-control application, accidentally
employed the weapon against a friend or family member. While undeniably
tragic, instances of mistaken identity are an unfortunate occurrence in traditional
home defense encounters.129 A recent study found that between 2015 and 2018,
“at least 47 Americans shot friends, loved ones, roommates, or emergency
responders that they mistook for home intruders.”130 A little more than half of
those cases led to criminal charges against the shooter. 131 While remote
controlled weapons’ high-definition video feed may not mitigate mistakenidentity shootings, manufacturers could take other measures to prevent these
tragedies. For instance, the robots could contain speakers, thereby enabling an
operator to remotely confront the suspected intruder before discharging the
weapon.,
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
See id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
128 See id. at 623.
129 See, e.g., Albert Samaha & Sean Campbell, She Thought She’d Shot a Burglar. Then
She Realized It Was Her Roommate, TRACE (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.thetrace.org/2018/03/mistaken-identity-shooting-self-defense/.
130 Id.
131 Id.
126
127
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Thus, it seems clear that specific technological features on robotic devices
may sway courts in determining whether they are in “common use” and are
“unusual or dangerous.” We next turn to examining three foreseeable remotely
controlled weapons and how they courts are likely to analyze them considering
recent Second Amendment jurisprudence.
III. APPLICATION TO SPECIFIC FORESEEABLE REMOTELY
CONTROLLED WEAPONS
Relying on the standards articulated above, this section prospectively
examines how federal and state courts would view bans on three conceivable
remotely controlled weapon systems: an armed flying drone designed to guard
the exterior of a home, an armed “Digidog,” designed to patrol exterior property
grounds, and the “Gunba,” designed strictly for in-home use.132 The following
analysis presumes that the weapons have been invented and are in the early
stages of marketing. Further, it presumes concerned state legislatures have
enacted statutes proscribing their use or possession. In response, the weapon’s
manufacturer has petitioned a court of competent jurisdiction to strike down the
legislation on Second Amendment grounds.
A. Armed Flying Drone
1. Description133
The armed flying drone is programmed to patrol the exterior perimeter of a
user’s property. The drone, programmed to fly within specified grid coordinates,
detects trespassers and alerts users by sending an alarm to their cell phone. Once
alerted, the user may access the drone’s high-definition live camera feed and
speaker system. A common commercial 9mm semiautomatic handgun is built
into the interior of the unit. A small hole in the robot’s frame allows the round
to be discharged towards an intended target. The interior compartment is made
with the same material as a protective gun safe. The weapon can only be
accessed for reloading and maintenance using a special key possessed by the
user.
Once alerted, the user has multiple options. He may notify the police,
communicate with the trespasser using the two-way speaker system, or

United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97–98 (3d Cir. 2010).
The weapon system descriptions offered in this section, while foreseeable, are
entirely hypothetical and solely based on the author’s imagination.
132
133
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discharge the firearm using the robot’s advanced targeting technology. Upon
pressing the “fire” button, the user is prompted to input a personalized four-digit
pass code on their smart phone. Once the user is authenticated, he must press
the “fire” button again to discharge one round. The process must be repeated
for each subsequent round.
Image 1-1134

2. Analysis
The Marzzarella two-step analysis first asks whether the statute at issue
burdens a Second Amendment right.135 To make its initial determination, the
court considers whether the weapon is in “common use” – typically possessed
by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, like self-defense.136 It will also ask
whether the weapon is “dangerous and unusual.”137 Additionally, certain long
standing gun control measures, such as registration requirements and
prohibitions on the mentally ill or felons from owning firearms, are
“presumptively lawful.”138 If the court determines that a burden exists, it will
move to the second prong and apply appropriate heightened scrutiny to match
the severity of the burden.
In determining whether the weapon is in “common use” the court must first
evaluate whether it considers the entire flying unit as a weapon or just the
semiautomatic handgun inside. The manufacturer will argue that the internal

134 Photograph of Golden Eagle Drone, in Golden Eagles by Teal Drones, FIZUAS,
https://fizuas.com/teal-drones-golden-eagle/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
135 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
136 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624–25 (2008).
137 Id. at 627.
138 Id. at 626–27 n.26.
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semiautomatic weapon is the same type that can be lawfully purchased at any
retail gun store. The only difference is that it has been modified to synchronize
with the user’s specific cell phone and aimed using its advanced targeting
technology. In contrast, the government will contend that the degree to which
the weapon has been modified renders it an entirely new species of firearm. The
drone, they will contend, cannot be divorced from the handgun.
The government will also argue that the drone exceeds the Heller “unusual
and dangerousness” threshold.139 The government would argue that legalizing
weaponized drones will create a society where firearms literally hover over
communities and neighborhoods every day. Additionally, since they are
designed to operate outdoors, they are more likely to be captured or confiscated
in the event they run out of batteries or are otherwise grounded. Thus, there is
an increased risk that the weapons could be “found” and carried away.
Additionally, the threat of firing rounds outdoors is inherently more dangerous
than indoors. In an outdoor context, missed rounds are more likely to ricochet
into unintended bystanders or become propelled through the walls of a nearby
domicile. The manufacturer would likely counter each assertion, arguing that
its advanced targeting system will make “misses” anomalous, and that, since the
drone’s internal compartment is essentially a gun safe, the weapon component
will not be easily accessible to a bad actor.
Finally, the government will cite the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act,
which has prohibited arming aerial drones since 2018.140 While the prohibition
is relatively new, the government will contend that it constitutes a historical
regulation and should therefore be afforded “presumptive validity” under
Heller.141
If the court finds the weapon to be in common use, it will then apply a
balancing test to determine whether the drone poses a substantial risk to a
governmental interest. To determine the degree of heightened scrutiny, the court
will look at how close the burden hits the “core” Second Amendment right: selfdefense in the home.142 In this regard, a critical factor is that the armed drone is
designed to operate outside of the home. Consequently, since the burden on the
right is not as strong as it would be inside of the home, the court would likely
apply intermediate scrutiny. If so, it will uphold the statute if it is substantially
related to an important government interest.143

Id. at 627.
FAA Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 363, 132 Stat. 3308 (2018)
(codified as 49 U.S.C § 44802 note (2018)).
141 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
142 See id. at 630.
143 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 253 (2d Cir. 2015).
139
140
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3. Conclusion
The court would likely uphold the blanket ban on the aerial defense drone for
multiple reasons. First, it may offer presumptive validity to the statute since it
comports with the established Federal Aviation Authority’s ban on arming
drones.144 If so, the court need not proceed to the two-pronged analysis.
If the court does not afford presumptive validity, determining whether the
weapon is commonly used is a tossup. If the court examines the entire armed
drone and determines that it, as a whole, constitutes a new species of weapon, it
may conclude that it is not in common use. However, if the court narrowly
analyzes only the internal 9mm, it may determine it to be in common use. Even
if the court finds that the internal handgun is sufficiently in common use, the
weapon will likely fail the “dangerous and unusual” analysis.145 The
government’s position that firing rounds outdoors is inherently dangerous will
be compelling. It is also likely that the court will find that a robotic weapon
designed for remote outdoor use will increase the risk to public safety. For
instance, if the device runs out of batteries or is grounded by inclement weather,
there is an increased likelihood that a passerby could abscond with the weapon.
Finally, in the unlikely event that the court advances to the balancing test, the
ban would survive intermediate scrutiny. Similar to the conclusion in Cuomo
regarding “assault weapons” and high-capacity magazines, the court would find
that citizens have many more viable options for self-defense and that avoiding
conditions where armed drones ubiquitously hover over society is in furtherance
of an important governmental interest.146
B. The Digidog
1. Description
The armed “Digidog” is substantially similar to the aerial drone in its
technological features, except that it patrols a designated area on the ground as
opposed to the air.147 Other than patrolling property, the Digidog is capable of
walking close to its designated user(s) to perform bodyguard functions.

See § 363, 132 Stat. 3308.
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
146 Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 269. Since the “reasonable regulation” standard employed by
states is less severe than the federal test, it would be redundant to analyze the statute’s
viability under the standard more deferential to the government.
147 See, E.g., Tony Aiello, New NYPD ‘Digidog’ Robot Raising Questions Among New
Yorkers, CBS N.Y. (Apr. 16, 2021), https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2021/04/16/nypd-robotdog-digidog/.
144
145
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Image 2-2148

2. Analysis:
An analysis of the Digidog is largely analogous to that of the aerial drone. It
is designed for self-defense outside of the home and, therefore, it is debatable
whether or not the handgun contained internally should be analyzed by itself or
as part of the entire robot, rendering it a new species of weapon that cannot be
deemed in common use.
However, the Digidog differs from an aerial drone in two meaningful ways.
First, there is no current statutory regulation or prohibition on the armed walking
robot like the FAA restriction.149 Consequently, there will be no presumptive
validity option for the court to rely upon. Secondly, the Digidog could be
effectively analogized to a human armed bodyguard, triggering the assertion that
it is protected as a Second Amendment auxiliary right. 150 If the court wrestles
with the bodyguard analogy, the government would likely argue that armed
bodyguards differ in that they are licensed entities and possess independent
agency to analyze threats based on their experience and unique education. In
contrast, a Digidog would possess no such independent agency, but would rather
be subject solely to its operator’s will. 151
Additionally, the proliferation of armed Digidogs could cultivate a world in
which citizens could be under constant threat of being shot by robotic
companions without warning.152 The court would likely weigh and balance the
Photograph of NYPD Digidog, in id.
See § 363, 132 Stat. 3308.
150 Terzian, supra note 104, at 759.
151 Armed Security Guard Training Requirements, SECURITY GUARD TRAINING HQ,
https://www.securityguardtraininghq.com/armed-security-guard-training/ (last visited Oct.
14, 2021) (listing armed security guard requirements in each state).
152 While admittedly armed humans can discharge firearms without warning, they must
148
149
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right of self-defense against the omnipresent threat created if such a weapon
were permitted to accompany citizens during their daily activities. Further, the
court would examine whether the Digidog constitutes an unusual or dangerous
weapon.
3. Conclusion
Like the aerial drone, the armed digidog ban would likely be upheld. The
weapon itself would likely be deemed unusual or dangerous since it would be
virtually impossible for members of the public to discern whether a nearby
Digidog was benignly accompanying its user or whether it was aimed and
primed to engage with lethal force. 153. Consequently, members of society would
not know whether to flee, seek cover, or otherwise defend themselves when
encountering a Digidog in the street. If the court advanced to the second prong’s
balancing test, the fact that the weapon is designed for self-defense outside the
home would trigger intermediate scrutiny of the proscriptive legislation.
Provided the reduced judicial scrutiny level, the court would find that legislation
banning such a weapon is substantially related to an important governmental
interest in preventing the creation of an environment in which citizens could be
engaged by a Digidog at any moment.
C. “The Gunba” Home Defense Robot
In contrast to the relatively simple analysis that the aerial drone and Digidog
present, the Gunba is more complex and may be more likely to receive Second
Amendment protection.
Description
As demonstrated in the guiding hypothetical, the Gunba is designed strictly
for in-home defense against intruders. Operationally, the Gunba functions much
like the aerial drone. Upon owner activation, it patrols the interior of the
domicile. If the Gunba assesses that an intruder has entered the house, it will
alert the owner and send a live high-definition video feed to their phone. Like
the aerial drone, the owner will have a menu of options available, including
notifying the police, using the Gunba’s speaker to warn the intruder and demand
that they leave the premises, or firing lethal or non-lethal munitions. Users must
generally remove the firearm from a holster and raise their arms to aim the weapon. This
action provides those around the individual with some chance to take life-saving evasive
measures.
153 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
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be schooled on the reasoning behind the spring gun case and be aware of
instances in which they may be held liable if they fire on an intruder who steps
into an empty house.154
The Gunba will be designed with numerous safety features intended to
prevent human error or criminal misuse. To prevent an accidental discharge, the
owner must input a 4-digit personalized pass code. Gunbas will be required to
be registered with the state and monitored by “Gunba Incorporated.” The robots
will be designed to function only inside a specified and programmed domicile.
If the unit is removed from the home, it will self-deactivate and alert the owner,
Gunba Inc., and the police. Additionally, the video feeds from the robots will
be stored by Gunba Inc., to facilitate law enforcement investigations, if
necessary.
In order for the Gunba to function, the owner must consent to Gunba Inc.
storing video feeds when a “shoot” order has been issued in support of likely
criminal investigation. Prior to use, owners will be required to visit a Gunba
outlet and receive a tutorial and training on how to safely operate it. The training
will specifically focus on the targeting system to reduce the likelihood of fired
rounds missing their targets. Finally, as part of the cost of its service, Gunba
Inc. will employ state-of-the-art cybersecurity protections to prevent hacks,
malware, or other intrusions.
Fundamentally, the Gunba is intended to provide a defense weapon and
service to citizens who would entertain owning a traditional weapon for
self/home defense but who may be inexperienced, uncomfortable, or unable to
do so. It also offers a novel capability for owners to defend vulnerable family
members that may be inside of the home even if the owner is located elsewhere.
In other words, a parent who works late nights will have the ability to defend
their sleeping children.
Image 3-3155

See generally Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
Photo of iRobot Vacuum, in Dan Seifert, iRobot Roomba i7+ review: smarter than
the average Robot vacuum, VERGE (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/20/18104679/irobot-roomba-i7-plus-robot-smartvacuum-review-price-specs-features.
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Analysis
Like the preceding weapons, the same common use question will present itself
to the court. Although, since the Gunba is specifically designed for internal
home use, the court may be persuaded to find that the 9mm handgun functions
in the same manner as it would be had someone fired it by hand indoors.
However, proponents of the legislation will surely invest themselves into
arguing that the weapon is novel and not in common use.
The Gunba will likely hurdle the “dangerous and unusual” factors as well. 156
Not only is the risk attendant with discharging a weapon outdoors not applicable,
but the manufacturer will doubtlessly produce data demonstrating that its
advanced targeting system is more accurate and safer than trained humans when
operating firearms under extreme stress. Further, the deactivation features on
the Gunba make it so that it can only be operated in a predetermined area. As
opposed to a traditional semi-automatic handgun, an owner will not have the
option to remove it from the home for a criminal purpose. Consequently, the
Gunba should be able to pass the first prong of the Marzzarella balancing test.157
In contrast to the aerial drone and Digidog, the government would be
proscribing a weapon specifically designed for in-home self-defense. Such
action may offend the “core” Second Amendment right, even more so than the
handgun ban at issue in Heller.158 Consequently, the manufacturer will argue
that a balancing test of any kind is prohibited by Heller, or at least, the strictest

156
157
158

See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 630.
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judicial scrutiny should be applied to the legislation.159
Nevertheless, presuming a court applies a judicial balancing test, the best
argument in favor of the ban is that criminals will use the robots, thereby
increasing the danger posed to police officers in the execution of lawful raids or
warrant-based searches.160 In fact, the existence and proliferation of remotecontrolled weapons could prompt universal reluctance to enter homes to
effectuate lawful arrests, which could make the community less safe. However,
this concern may be overcome by the required registration with Gunba, Inc. If
the government seeks to execute a search warrant, it could coordinate with
Gunba, Inc., to disable the registered Gunba during the specific time of the raid,
thereby increasing officer safety and preserving the tactical element of surprise
that is crucial to law enforcement operations.
Conclusion
If safety features exist and the court follows Heller and the Marzzarella twostep analysis, the Gunba ban will almost certainly succumb to strict scrutiny
review.161 The Gunba’s only foreseeable vulnerabilities lie with the common
use test. If the federal or state governments proactively prohibit remote
controlled weapons before they are developed, they could successfully argue
that these weapons are not in common use and/or have been subject to historic
proscription.162 Thus, time may be of the essence. If the manufacture and
proliferation of Gunba-like robots predate a legislative ban, the new technology
may increase its odds of receiving Second Amendment protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps predictably, the answer to whether remotely controlled weapons are
protected by the Second Amendment prompts the classic lawyerly response: “it
depends.” Heller and its progeny have carved out a test that grants judges
significant flexibility to determine the relative lawfulness of the weapon. 163
However, amidst the legal murkiness, it is relatively clear that the Second
Amendment is at its maximum protection when being applied for the purpose of
See id. at 635; but see Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
161 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
162 While proscriptive state legislation may pass the deferential “reasonable regulation”
standard applied in state courts, such laws would most certainly be challenged in federal
circuit courts. When those challenges would be brought, the federal circuits would apply
the more stringent Marzzarella two-step analysis. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
163 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
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self-defense inside one’s home.164 That stipulation offers an opportunity for a
remotely controlled weapon, such as the Gunba, to be constitutionally protected.
Though many will be disheartened by the further proliferation of weapons,
advances in technology could conceivably make them operationally safer, while
enhancing Americans’ ability to defend themselves and their families in their
hearth and home.
It is clear that a robust discussion about how Second Amendment
jurisprudence will intersect with robotic technology is on the horizon.165
Perhaps, this piece will serve as an opening salvo in a greater dialogue that
encourages proactive legal analysis of technologically advanced weapon
systems that may test the Second Amendment’s scope.

164
165

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Id.
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